Manufacturing Industry Contracts Again In March (Update 2)

China’s manufacturing industry shrank for an eighth straight month in March as collapsing global trade cut exports and growth across Asia. The CLSA China Purchasing Managers’ Index dropped to a seasonally adjusted 44.8 last month from 45.1 in February. Any reading on these indexes below 50 means contraction.



The manufacturing component of the index continued to increased, rising for a fourth month from a record low of 40.9 in November. The export orders index rose to 41.4from 39.5 in February. New orders climbed to 43.6 from 44.2. Output gained to 44.3 from 43.9, while the employment index rose to 47.1 from 46.6, its second increase in eight months.

“A worsening of domestic manufacturing orders lies behind the drop in the PMI and accords with what we are seeing on the ground in the steel industry,” said Eric Fishwick, head of economic research at CLSA in Hong Kong. “Expect the production index to show softness in April......More encouragingly, export orders continue to improve,” he added “They are still falling but at the most moderate pace since October.”

Update: Rival Indexes At Work (Thursday 8 April)


Well, following a question in comments (see below) I think it worth adding a few details about the "other" PMI reading which is available, the China Federation of Logistics & Purchasing (CFLP) one. The CFLP PMI rebounded to 52.4% in March 2009, up from 49.0% in the previous month. The index was back to the expansionary zone of higher than 50% for the first time since October last year. Output index, new orders index and purchases of inputs index were also higher than the critical level of 50% in March. Except stocks of finished goods, all sub-indices were higher than their respective levels in the previous month. Of which, imports index grew strongly by 7.0 ppt. to 48.8% in March, compared to the previous month.



Many commentators have taken the CFLP reading at face value without bothering to contrast. Thus Bloomberg's Li Yanping, in a very bullish article:

China’s manufacturing expanded for the first time in six months, spurred by the government’s 4 trillion yuan ($585 billion) stimulus package. The Purchasing Manager’s Index rose to a seasonally adjusted 52.4 in March from 49 in February, the Federation of Logistics and Purchasing said today in Beijing in an e-mailed statement. A reading above 50 indicates an expansion. The expansion may help President Hu Jintao achieve his target of 8 percent economic growth for the world’s third- biggest economy. The report comes as he attends a Group of 20 summit in London where world leaders are discussing remedies for the worst global recession since World War II. Hu’s stimulus package already triggered jumps in urban investment and loan growth in the first two months of this year.

or PNB Paribas:

China Logistics Information Center (CLIC) release March PMI rose to 52.4 from 49 of February, the fourth months of continues improvement. PMI breached 50 the first time since September 2008, suggesting the industrial sector is resuming sequential expansion after 5 months of continuous drop.

Overall, the NBS PMI suggest that March industrial sector resumed sequential expansion despite further deterioration of export, this recovery is due to strong fiscal stimulus, aggressive credit expansion at 24.5% y/y pace and relative resilient household demand for property, autos and other durables. Though export outlook remain gloomy, however the G20 and global quantitative easing seem to be providing a floor to global demand. While Q2 growth should remain anemic, however the rebound of PMI suggests Q2 domestic demand growth is on an increasingly firm footing.

PNB Paribas basically put the difference down to differences in sample size:

The widening gap between CLIC PMI and CLSA survey PMI is due to different sampling, CLIC survey focused on 738 major industrials accounting for 20% of VAIO.

But as I indicate in comments, the difference is only in part about sample size, there is also a difference in methodology, largely connected with seasonal adjustment, not an un-important issue when the lunar new year impact is knocking around somewhere in the data. Indeed CLSA made this point abundantly clear in a note released alongside their report:

"It is true that the CFLP survey sample size is larger than that of the CLSA China PMI...therefore the standard error of the (population) estimates from the CFLP survey should be around 25 percent smaller than those from the China PMI," according to the CLSA note released on April 1. "However in practice all of this is academic. Differences in the samples are dwarfed by differences in how each set of statisticians adjust for seasonality in the data," said the note. CLSA said it had tuned the March figure as the February and March varied in number of days in a month and the latter month affected by the long Chinese lunar New Year holiday. Though both sides made seasonality adjustment, the CFLP figure was usually boosted by around three points by seasonality in March, said the CLSA note.

So you can accept the version you want to accept here, but be careful, since the level of confidence to be attached to either reading is moderate. At the end of the day the proof of the pudding here will be in the eating, when we get the March year on year industrial output data, ince this will either be just slightly up, or just slightly down on March 2008 -and remember in the meantime there has been a large expansion incapacity.


Second Update Monday April 13

And well, the mystery only deepens, since now we have an advance on the statistical data (thanks to Premier Wen Jiabao) and we learn that China's industrial output was apparently up by 8.3% year on year in March:

China's industrial output rose 8.3 percent in March, in a sign that a huge stimulus package is kicking in, Premier Wen Jiabao said in an interview published on Monday. Last month's growth accelerated from the 3.8-percent rise in the first two months as domestic demand continued to improve, Wen said, according to the China Securities Journal. Fixed asset investment and retail sales, which measure spending on infrastructure and consumption respectively, also increased quickly in the first quarter, he said in an interview while in Thailand for the ASEAN summit at the weekend. All this showed the economy was performing "better than expected" thanks to Beijing's measures to tackle the international financial crisis, he said. China in November unveiled an unprecedented four-trillion-yuan (580-billion-dollar) stimulus package to ward off the worst effects of the global crisis. However, Wen said the nation's export-dependent economy was still facing major difficulties due to a sharp contraction in foreign demand, which has placed increasing pressure on employment. "The international financial crisis has not yet hit the bottom. It's hard to say that China alone has steered away from the crisis," he said. "We should never overlook (the risks)." Wen's comments came just days before the National Statistics Bureau is slated to release first quarter data on the Chinese economy on Thursday. Tai Hui, an economist with Standard Chartered in Singapore, said the March growth in industrial output was boosted partly by companies filling their inventories after depleting them in recent months. However, the level of growth remains modest compared with before the crisis, and the overall economy is still weak, he said. "The economic environment,although it has improved, remains relatively weak due to the global financial turmoil," he said.

The mystery deepens in part becuase exports fell in March, more slowly than February, but still sharply - 17% yoy (following a 25.7% drop in Feb):

China's exports fell 17 percent in March, a less sharp contraction than the month before, amid signs the plunge in overseas demand may be easing, the government reported Friday. But while the decline in exports eased somewhat, a sharper weakening in imports pushed China's trade surplus to $18.56 billion, up from $4.84 billion the month before, the General Administration of Customs said. Exports totaled $90.3 billion in March, the fifth straight month of year-on-year declines due to the global downturn. In February, exports sank 25.7 percent from a year earlier in the worst drop in more than a decade. Imports in March fell 25 percent to $71.7 billion, the customs data showed. China's imports fell 24 percent in February. "The pace of contraction in exports has moderated notably from January-February levels, as export activity showed signs of stabilization," Jing Ulrich, chairman for China equities for J.P.Morgan, said in a report to clients. "Imports remained weak but there are some initial signs of recovery in China's raw materials demand, driven by government stockpiling and record imports of iron ore," she said.

It's frankly hard to understand why imports would be falling more than exports if you had a domestic demand lead recovery process at work. Brad Setser has a readable go at explaining things here:

The Wall Street Journal puts a more positive gloss on China’s March trade data than I would. To me the overarching story is simple: the data paint a story of deep distress in both the Chinese and global economy. China’s exports were growing 20% y/y (23% actually) in the third quarter of 2008. They were down nearly 20% (19.7%) in the first quarter of 2009. Imports though fell by more, in part because of the fall in oil prices. Imports fell close to 30% y/y in the first quarter. That isn’t just a function of falling commodity prices and fewer imported components either; US exports to China — which presumably include a lot of capital goods — are way down y/y. As a result, China’s trade surplus was larger in the first quarter of 2009 than in the first quarter of 2008 ($62 billion v $41 billion). The global shock has gotten rid of many of the world’s macroeconomic imbalances. American households are saving more and importing less, so the US deficit is down. The oil exporters are no longer running a surplus. Even Japan’s surplus has come down, as demand for Japan’s exports has fallen more rapidly than Japan’s commodity import bill. China’s surplus though has continued to rise.

So this is really the point I think: with a growing surplus (at this point, and on a year on year basis) China's economy isn't going to pull the rest of the world anywhere, since essentially it is still draining-off demand from elsewhere.

But even if China seems an unlikely candidate to pull the global train out of the mire, we still need to try and understand what it is exactly that is going on in Chinese domestic industrial activity. One part of the explanation undoubtedly lies in domestic loan growth. Bloomberg report that China’s new lending surged more than sixfold from a year earlier to a record 1.89 trillion yuan ($277 billion) in March, which compares with the previous high of 1.62 trillion yuan posted in January. Domestic loans grew 29.8% in March, from a year earlier - analysts had been expecting a 25.1% jump. M2 - often considered the broadest measure of money supply - grew year on year by 25.5 percent, according to the central bank.

Bloomberg report that this is the fastest growth rate for M2 since they began compiling data in 1998. China’s banks, which are mostly state-owned, have already implemented new lending almost up to the government’s target of 5 trillion yuan of new loans this year. Indeed, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. lending may exceeed the target level by as much as 3 trillion yuan. China has certainly mounted the credit tiger in its race to meet the government's official growth target of 8% this year, but while growth propelled by government stimulus and easier access to credit may spawn new projects and stem job losses in China, it won't necessarily translate into industrial profits, and indeed in the medium term it may even lead to a large pile-up of Non Performing Loans.

While no one at this stage believes that the percentage of such loans could reach 2003 levels (20.4% of the total, or 16.5% of GDP) many believe the danger that Chinese vabks could see another wave of loan defaults is rising. This, is the view being taken, for example, by Fitch Ratings, who in a recent report warn that loan defaults could rise to 5% or 6% of total lending, as Euromoney's Sudip Roy argues:

The biggest proportion of new lending by the banks is through discounted bills, which supply working capital. Long-term to medium-term corporate loans are the second-biggest component. More than 70% of the new lending, according to official figures, is through these two channels, which should be low-risk financing."It is hard to predict the quality of all of the lending in January and February but a large proportion of it was mid- to long-term loans to infrastructure projects with stable funding and government support," says Lian Ping, chief economist at Bank of Communications in Shanghai... banks often categorize loans that are rolled over as performing even though they have not been repaid on their original maturity date. "In practice, this means that a one-year working capital loan that is not repaid at maturity can take another one or more years before being classified as nonperforming," says Fitch. Instead, many banks classify these advances as special mention or even normal loans. Special mention loans are effectively non-performing in all but word.

What’s especially worrying, according to Fitch, is that if a comparison is made for each of the 16 leading banks of the levels of their equity and loan-loss reserves against their portfolio of NPLs and special mention loans, then in every case the latter "swamped reserves, while for many banks equity also was severely affected". And these banks are the largest and healthiest in the country, adds Fitch.

In a sign that some of the lending is already reaching infrastructure and real estate projects China's National Statistics Bureau said on Monday that spending on property development was up from a year earlier by 4.1% in the first quarter, following a rise of only 1% in January and February. Property sales were also up year on year (by 8.2%) in the first quarter, after sliding in January and February. However urban real estate prices in 70 major cities were down 1.3% in March, compared with March 2008, confirming the general deflationary environment.


Further foreign direct investment into China fell for a sixth month in March, dropping 9.5 percent from a year earlier to $8.4 billion, as compared with a 15.8 percent decline in February. For the first quarter as a whole, spending fell 20.6 percent to $21.8 billion. Foreign-invested businesses account for 30 percent of industrial output, 55 percent of trade and 11 percent of urban jobs according to Commerce Ministry spokesman Yao Jian at the press conference where the FDI data were released. The rate of decline in FDI is slowing however, since while this is the first time since 2000 that investment from abroad has fallen for six straight months, the absolute value of investment in March was the largest in nine months and the decline from a year earlier was the smallest in the last three months. Thus it would be premature to draw any definitive conclusions at this point.

And just one more data point to add to all those quandrys, China’s March power output fell about 2 percent from a year earlier according to an official from the China Electricity Council, citing preliminary data. The drop is smaller than in previous months, the official said today, declining to be named before the official data release.

Power production fell 3.7 percent in the first two months from a year earlier, the National Bureau of Statistics said on March 12. Further, China's power output fell 0.7 percent in March from a year earlier, according to Caijing magazine on April 3, citing the State Grid Corp. of China, the country’s biggest electricity distributor. On the other hand China Central Television reported on April 11, citing the Electricity Council, that electricity use was up “noticeably” in March from February. Now this little snippet of information would appear at first sight to be at variance (but not in contradiction) with the March year on year data, until you consider the sort of seasonal influences we have been encountering in this post. So it is quite possible that power consumption was up sharply month on month, and down slightly year on year. What seems hard to understand, at least from where I am sitting, is how power consumption can have fallen while industrial output surges 8.3%. When you put this together with the import data, and the rising surplus, then something quite simply doesn't add up here.

This impression that all may not be moving as planned under the "official version" would seem to find some confirmation in the latest reports that the Chinese government is considering additional stimulus measures to boost consumption and bolster growth. According to a report in the official China Securities Journal - citing Gao Huiqing, a researcher at the State Information Center - the government will issue some “guideline” policies and continue to use fiscal and taxation measures to spur an expansion. This follows this weekends statement from Premier Wen Jiabao that China would “closely” monitor changes in the domestic and world economy and “hammer out” new response plans when needed.

Gao, who is affiliated with the National Development and Reform Commission, indicated that the kind of recovery mentioned by Premier Wen, spurred as it is by rebounding inventories and sales of property and cars, may be short-lived without a global rebound which will increase demand for Chinese exports.

“While the stimulus is indeed having an effect on loan growth and some measures of economic activity, the trend decline in exports is unbroken,” said James McCormack, head of Asia sovereign ratings at Fitch Ratings in Hong Kong. “Chinese gross domestic product growth will remain below potential until the global economy recovers.”

Indeed according to Zheng Xinli, the deputy policy research head of the Chinese Communist Party, China’s 2009 exports may shrink by as much 10 percent over 2008. So what we have here, is more like a make and mend, hold the line, stimulus approach, as the government tries to soften the external blow, rather than a full blooded, domestic demand driven recovery.

According to initial reports the new package is likely to be focused on social welfare spending and on boosting consumer consumption, both of which are to be fuelled by the record fiscal deficit China is expected to run this year. China is, for example, subsidizing 20 billion yuan this year on rural purchases of televisions and refrigerators and plans to increase spending on welfare by 29 percent. In the long term, the government is also planning an expanded social safety net, and the State Council published earlier this month an 850 billion yuan health-care plan, including building at least one hospital in every county and expanding medical insurance coverage to 90 percent of the 1.3 billion population by 2011. All welcome measures, but not surely the ones which will lead us all collectively away from the abyss.

Prices Drop As Exports Fall

Perhaps one of the most heated debates which is taking place among investors and economists at the present time relates to China. Economic growth plunged in the fourth quarter of last year, and the economy may even have contracted. Yet the government has lashed out "loads of money" on a huge stimulus programme. Will this work? The Jury is still out.

Certainly some sectors of the economy are suffering badly and China’s trade surplus plunged in February on the back of a record drop in exports. The trade gap narrowed to $4.8 billion - roughly one eighth of the amount registered in January, according to data from the customs bureau. China's trade surplus hit a record $40 billion in November. Exports dropped sharply in February - down 25.7 percent from a year earlier (following a 17.5% fall in January), while the collapse in imports slowed, falling by "only" 24.1 percent following January's record 43.1 percent decline.

Meanwhile China announced earlier this week that its consumer inflation fell for the first time in more than six years in February, suggesting we might now be entering a period of price deflation - the consumer price index fell 1.6 per cent from a year earlier in February. This followed a 1.0 per cent rise in January .



China's CPI last fell in December 2002, when it dropped 0.4 per cent, capping a year in which CPI fell every month save one. The latest data show the risks of prolonged general price declines - deflation - are rising. Beijing has targeted headline inflation of 4 per cent this year but it certainly now looks like the government will struggle to get prices back into positive territory and may have to confront a prolonged period of deflation. Food prices, a key component of in the Chinese CPI, fell 1.9 per cent in February from a year earlier; non-food prices fell 1.2 per cent.

And more evidence of possible deflation in the works comes from wholesale prices, since the producer price index fell 4.5 per cent in February from a year earlier, a steeper drop than January's 3.3 per cent decline.


Industrial Output Falls Back


China’s industrial-production growth slowed at the start of the year on the back of the export decline, with output rising only 3.8 percent in January and February from a year earlier, slowing from a 5.7 percent increase in December.

However China’s investment spending has maintained its momentum (and even increased), as the government pours money into roads, railways and power grids. Urban fixed-asset investment climbed by 26.5 percent in January and February from a year earlier.



Retail sales, on the other hand, have been slowing, and rose by 15.2 percent in February from a year earlier in current price terms (after a 19 percent rise in December) or by 16.8% in real (price adjusted) terms (given that prices fell year on year). The downward momentum in retail sales growth since the summer is evident on both measures.




Huge Loan Expansion

So the big question is to just what extent will the government investment programme help restructure the economy? Certainly it won't kickstart it, since the export sector is dependent on demand elsewhere, and that is unlikely to move in the near tyerm. However the emphasis in Chinese economic activity might be able to switch towards domestic consumption, and that is the big question we now face. Certainly bank lending has increased, with China’s new loans more than quadrupling in February (from a year earlier) as the government pressed banks to support a 4 trillion yuan $585 billion). The problem is, just how much of this lending can turn bad?

Banks extended 1.07 trillion yuan of local-currency loans in February and M2 climbed 20.5 percent from a year earlier, the fastest pace in more than five years, after growing 18.8 percent in January. The lending, which is in addition to a record 1.62 trillion yuan in new loans in January has given rise to concerns that the pace of new lending may be unsustainable and endanger the overall health of the financial system. Lax credit assessment now may lead to an upward surge in delinquencies in the months and years to come.”



Central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan said earlier this month that loans and money supply may have grown too quickly, since Premier Wen Jiabao announced a whole year target for lending of 5 trillion yuan, so that the banks are already halfway through their target with 10 months still to go. The surge in credit has also triggered concern that some of the money is being pumped into the stock market. The Shanghai Composite Index which tracks China’s largest stock exchanges is now up by 17 percent since the start of the year.

The worries about bad debts are being taken seriously, and China’s banking regulator have told banks to boost provisions to 150 percent of their outstanding non-performing loans, according to an article in the 21st Century Business Herald. The bad loan ratios of the country's five biggest banks -- Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd., Agricultural Bank of China, China Construction Bank Corp., Bank of China Ltd., and Bank of Communications Ltd., is to be raised to 150 percent from 130 percent at the end of 2008, while the requirement for smaller national banks remains unchanged at 150 percent.

Liu Mingkang, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, has described such moves as "prudent", and in line with the regulatory decision to carry out spot checks on bank loan books to “ensure quality of growth”.

Rural Squeeze

But while the banks dole out the money, and stocks surge, China’s rural population are feeling the pinch as farm incomes drop this year on the back of falling agricultural prices.

“The pressure from declining agricultural prices is high,” Yin Chengjie, vice chairman of agricultural and rural affairs of the National People’s Congress, said in an interview in Beijing. “We cannot be optimistic about growth” in farm incomes this year, he said.

Prices of agricultural products - including cotton, soybeans and corn have fallen over the past year as bumper harvests swelled stocks and restaurant sales and food processing output declined. The net consequence is that the disparity between the urban and rural population is widening, and the situation is further aggravated by the large number of migrant workers who now find themselves unemployed and have returned to their villages.


And just to show that the export data isn't simply a one off problem, it is worth noting that the OECD leading indicators reading has been sliding steadily for months now, and continue on its way down in January regardless (see chart below). Also foreign direct investment in China fell for a fifth consecutive month in February.
Investment dropped 15.8 percent to $5.83 billion from a year earlier - according to the commerce ministry - compared with a 32.6 percent decline in January. So the stimulus programme is acting as a brake on the rate of decline, but we still have a decline. That, I think, is the best we can hop for at this point.

Exports Tumble As China Enters Deflation

Is China about to lead the charge out of the current slump, or is the Chinese economy about to succumb to it? This appears to be one of the most interesting and most hotly debated questions of the moment. On the one hand the latest manufacturers PurchasingManufacturers Index seemed to suggest the contraction in China's economy slowed in January, while other data, in particular producer price inflation, loan growth, employment figures and movements in external trade seem to give a rather different impression.

External Trade Drops Sharply

China’s exports fell at the fastest rate in almost 13 years in January while imports fell completely off the cliff, plunging at the record rate of 43.1% year on year, indicating that the contraction in the world’s third-biggest economy may well be gathering rather than losing pace. Exports were down by 17.5 percent from January 2008.

Due to the massive fall in imports China's trade surplus remained high - at $39.11 billion it was the second largest on record - and this is almost guaranteed to add to tensions as global leaders seek to avoid a return to protectionism. China’s economic slowdown has already cost the jobs of 20 million migrant workers and the economy is now almost certainly contracting, rather than, as some argue, simply slowing.


Exports to the European Union fell 17.4 percent, while those to the U.S. were down 9.8 percent. Shipments of electronics goods dropped 21 percent. Steel slid 32.5 percent and toys declined 14.7 percent, although the numbers are possibly exacerbated by the week-long Lunar New Year holiday, which took place in January this year as opposed to February last year.


Chinese government researchers have already begun to advocate weakening the yuan against the dollar to support exports, and according to a report from the Ministry of Finance’s research institute published earlier this month China should “actively guide” the yuan to about 6.93 to the dollar to aid growth and boost employment, although there is no indication at this point that such a recommendation will be acted on.

It is very hard to know what is the actual present condition of the Chinese economy, since while it grew by 6.8 percent from a year earlier in the fourth quarter of last year - following a 9 percent in Q3 - this data point doesn't actually tell us too much about the current rate of expansion/contraction, and since things are changing very quickly this is quite important. The same goes for the official industrial output numbers which tell us output was up at a 5.7 percent annual rate in December, down from 17.4 percent a year earlier, but don't tell us what happened between November and December.

China Compared With The Other Asian Exporters

Some commentators are arguing that the drop in Chinese exports is not that severe if we compare it with the decline in other Asian countries, suggesting in effect that China is less export dependent than some of its neighbours.

“While the recent export slowdown has been alarming, China’s export slump has not been as severe as in some neighboring countries with a greater reliance on high-tech exports,” said Jing Ulrich, head of China equities with JPMorgan in Hong Kong. Taiwan’s exports fell a record 44 percent in January.

But this view seems to me to be misleading, and possibly ill-founded. According to a recent research report from DBS, two things stand out in the latest data. First, China’s exports to the US have obviously fallen considerably. In fact, they have fallen by around 9% since October (USD terms, sa, 3mma). Exports to Europe have also fallen by a similar amount. But Asia’s exports to China have fallen by four times more - or 37%. If China were simply passing along weak demand from the US and Europe to its neighbors, the drop in Asia’s exports to China ought to be roughly proportionate. So obviously they’re not.

DBS suggest that there is thus a huge disconnect between the fall in global demand for China’s exports and China’s demand for Asian exports.

Secondly , China’s demand for Asian exports starts to drop sharply in August, fully three months before China’s exports themselves begin to drop. A number of interpretations are possible at this point. One possibility is that the decline in other parts of Asia reflected a decline in new orders which only later hits China (in which case we should expect China's exports to take much stronger hits in February and March). Another is that China was the “leader”, not the“follower”, with much of the Asian exports being directed to fuelling China's internal investment boom. There is a third possibility here, and that is since China is very energy dependent, a significant share in the imports drop is a reflection of the fall in energy prices, since oil did, conveniently, peak in July 2008.

Possibly there is some truth in all these arguments, but, in terms of quantities and in terms of timing, there does seem to be something “autonomous”going on with Chinese demand. And if its not simply about the drop in demand from the US, what is it about?




Could the end of the Olympics bubble have something to do with the disconnect, and with the subsequent bust in Asian exports? It certainly seems to be more than a coincidence that China’s imports from Asia rise sharply in the run-up tothe August Olympics and then fall sharply immediately thereafter.

Price Changes Hit Deflation Territory

Prices in China have now started to fall, with producer prices dropping in January by 3.3 percent -the most in almost seven years. Consumer prices rose 1 percent in January from a year earlier, after gaining 1.2 percent in December, but these are year on year numbers, and the recent decline in month on month prices changes, despite a surge in food prices as we entered the Lunar New Year celebrations, have generally moved into negative territory.



In particular, food prices are usually higher during the Chinese new year celebrations and for that reason consumer prices were probably higher than usual in January. Despite inflation declining less than expected in January, there are signs that inflationary pressure is easing fast and it is likely that China will enter deflationary territory in the coming months. Inflation excluding food in January plunged from 0.6% year on year to -0.6% (see chart below).




The residential component showed an unexpected large drop from 1.1% year on year to minus 2.3%. Besides food - which is running just below 5% year on year - all the other major components are now in negative territory.

“Inflation could have been close to zero or worse if not for the Chinese New Year, because vegetable prices and grain prices went up,” said Wang Tao, China economist at UBS AG in Beijing.

McDonalds, the world’s largest fast-food chain, said last week that it was cutting the prices on some of its meals in China by as much as one-third to attract customers to its 1,050 restaurants across the country.

So my feeling is that we have now entered a deflationary period in China, of longer or shorter duration depending on whether or now the authorities are successful in turning the economy around. The rate of price deflation, and in particular in producer prices, will certainly give us one convenient indicator of the rate of contraction. Further, the inflation slowdown will put additional pressure on the central bank to cut interest rates, since the key one-year lending rates still stands at 5.31 percent - following a total of 2.16 percentage points in reductions at the end of 2008 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The central bank has not yet cut rates so far this year, despite the fact that with inflation now around zero, and the economy more than likely contracting, those 5 percentage points represent very tight monetary conditions. Of course, and looked at from another perspective, any further loosening in interest rates may well not be all that positive for the yuan.


Mind What You Say

During the lunar new year festival Chinese people send traditional greetings to each other, such as "Caiyuan gungun" (May prosperity come rolling to you) or "Xinxiang shicheng" (May you achieve all your desires). This year, festive well-wishers have had to be careful which salutations they choose. “Caiyuan gungun” has been virtually banned because it sounds exactly the same as the phrase meaning “laid off and discarded”. “Xinxiang shicheng” is also out of favour because it sounds suspiciously like the Chinese for “40 per cent pay cut”.

Giant Credit Surge In January

The Chinese government has now abandoned quotas for new credit growth and has urged state-owned commercial banks to offer finance for the Rmb 4,000bn ($586bn) fiscal spending plan which is due to run over the next two years. As a result there are now plenty of signs of monetary losening, among which is the fact that new loans rose at a record pace in January while the money supply expanded at the fastest pace in more than a year. Banks extended Rmb 1,620 bn of new local-currency loans and M2 climbed 18.8 percent from a year earlier. The new lending was equivalent in size to 40 percent of the proposed stimulus spending.

“Explosive lending growth is unsustainable and will likely decelerate,” said Ha Jiming, Hong Kong-based chief economist at China International Corp. “China may face increased risks going forward if the lending upsurge is coupled with declining loan quality and loosened lending terms.”

The biggest proportion of new lending, 39 percent, was through discounted bills, which could be though of as supplying working capital, rather than funding investment. Medium and long-term corporate loans accounted for 32 percent.

Also of note, consumer credit grew by 121bn in January, and this was almost evenly divided between short and long term credit. These together accounted for just 7% of total credit growth. The level of consumer credit growth was the largest in just over a year, but it was not far above the levels prevailing in 2007. Consumer demand in the holiday month should have been particularly strong in relation to the rest ofthe year, so this rather mediocre result suggest a weakness in the underlying dynamic of consumption growth that could become more apparent as the year progresses.

China Is At The Start, Not The Finish, Of The Slowdown

At this point in time it would seem highly premature to start speculating that China's economy may be turning the corner. Many have read the lates CLSA PMI survey, which showed the output index rose in January to 39.7 from 38.6 (which had been a record low) in December, as signs of turning the corner. New orders were even up to 39.9 from 37, while the export orders component rose to 36.3 from 33.6. So the situation was better in January than December, but it is SO important to remember that these sub-components all indicate ongoing contraction, and it is very, very early to start saying that all this has "bottomed".



The collapse of China’s export engine has obviously hit the most vulnerable first, and the Chinese authorities estimate that 20m of an estimated 130m rural migrant workers in China's industrial sector have lost their jobs and returned to home towns and villages. The implied 15.3 per cent unemployment rate among migrants is not captured in official jobless numbers, which measure only urban workers who register as unemployed. That official number rose to 8.86m people, or 4.2 per cent of the urban workforce, in December, but many specialists say this number vastly underestimates the true scale of the problem.

And in this environment it is hard to see the "big switch" to a consumption driven economy moving slowly, if indeed it moves at all.

China's Manufacturing Sector Continued To Contract In January

China’s manufacturing contracted for a sixth consecutive month in January as shrinking global demand hit the country's export-driven economy. The CLSA China Purchasing Managers’ Index rose to a seasonally adjusted 42.2 from 41.2 in December. Since any reading below 50 indicates contraction, even though the rate of contraction dropped (and has been dropping since November, see chart below) China's manufacturing sector (and hence China's economy) is still contracting. What we don't know at this point is how quickly China GDP is contracting, we won't know that till someone with the time and ingenuity devises a way to calculate a rough and ready quarter on quarter (seasonally adjusted) output indicator. Come on, be famous for a day, go out and do it (since the Chinese statistics office apparently have no interest in the matter), I would, but I simply don't have the time, since Europe, not China, is my focus. However, on a rough and ready, back of the envelope, basis my guess is that this months Chinese reading may be equivalent to something like a quarter on quarter contraction rate of around 0.5%, which means that what we have at this point is a 2% annual contraction rate, but we really need to see some actual data to calibrate all this a bit better I think.

In the CLSA survey, output index rose to 39.7 from 38.6 (which had been a record low) in December. New orders were up to 39.9 from 37. The index of export orders rose to 36.3 from 33.6. So the situation was better in January than December, but it is SO important to remember that these sub-components all indicate ongoing contraction.

My guess is that Chinese companies are squeezing costs and margins as far as the lemon will take it, since there is little evidence of any uptick in aggregate global demand for manufactured products, au contraire. My guess is also that they are grabbing market share by entering the supply chain in places they haven't been before. For example, Hafei Aviation Industry Co., China’s second-largest listed aerospace company, surged to its highest level in almost six months in Shanghai trading this morning after the announcement that it had formed a venture to supply composite-material components to Airbus SAS.

Airbus plans to give 5 percent of the work making parts for A350 airframes to Chinese companies in a bid to win market share in the world’s second-biggest aviation market. The planemaker has also opened an aircraft assembly line in China, its first outside of Europe.

Harbin Hafei will start production in September, and it plans to open a new plant by the end of 2010, Airbus said. Hafei, Avichina Industry & Technology Co. and Harbin Development Zone Heli Infrastructure Development Co. will each hold 10 percent of the venture. Harbin Aircraft Industry Group Co. will own a 50 percent stake. Airbus will have a 20 percent stake.

Unemployment Surges Dramatically

Chinese manufacturers also shed jobs last month at the fastest pace since the survey began in 2004, with the employment index falling to a record low of 45, so obviously as workers lose their jobs internal consumption is also affected, and we clearly have worse to come in the immediate future.

Chen Xiwen, a senior rural planning official, estimated that about 20 million migrant workers had lost their jobs because of the nation’s economic slowdown at a press briefing in Beijing today.

More than 20m rural migrant workers in China have lost their jobs and returned home as a result of the global economic crisis according to government figures, raising the spectre of widespread unrest in the authoritarian country. By the start of the Chinese New Year Spring Festival on 25 January, 15.3 per cent of China’s 130m migrant workers had lost their jobs and returned from manufacturing centres in the south and east of the country to their home villages or towns, according to Chen Xiwen, Director of the Office of Central Rural Work Leading Group, who was quoting a survey from the Ministry of Agriculture.

Government figures show that in recent years 6m to 7m new rural migrant workers a year have poured out of the countryside to fill the factories, construction sites and restaurants of the booming cities, which means the government must actually deal with as many as 27m new jobless in the countryside. On top of that, a survey by a government think-tank in December estimated 1.5m recent tertiary graduates in China were unable to find work by the end of November and universities and technical colleges are expected to churn out another 6.5m graduates this year. According to rough official calculations one percentage point of Chinese GDP growth creates around 1m jobs.

Chinese Premier Wen explicitly declined to rule out a devaluation of the yuan in an interview with the Financial Times today, although , he said that for the moment the government was content to keep the currency stable at what he considered to be a balanced and reasonable level.

Asked if China bore any responsibility for causing the financial crisis, as a number of economists believe, he stiffens and says in a low voice: “It is a ridiculous view.” But he makes it clear that Beijing will do whatever is needed to maintain growth at “about 8 per cent” this year. “Running our own affairs well is our biggest contribution to mankind,” he says. If necessary, some of the country’s huge stash of foreign currency reserves could be put towards this endeavour – a new plan to enable the use of reserves for domestic purposes is under discussion, he says.

“We must take forceful steps. Under special circumstances, necessary and extraordinary measures are required,” he says. “We should not be restricted by conventions. Success or failure depends on the pace and intensity of those measures.”

Mr Wen refuses to make an explicit commitment not to devalue the Chinese currency during the crisis – as the government did after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, a pledge that helped engineer the eventual recovery and won China a lot of prestige. But he does rule out any big shifts in the value of the Chinese currency.

“I want to make it very clear that maintaining the stability of the renminbi at a balanced and reasonable level is not only in the interests of China but also the interests of the world,” he says. “Many people have not yet come to see this point that if we have drastic fluctuation in the exchange rate of the renminbi, it would be a big disaster.”

The yuan fell 0.1 percent to 6.8471 against the dollar as of 12:23 p.m. in Shanghai today, a drop which is largely a by-product of the fall in the euro against USD.

China Nears Recession Point As GDP Slumps

China’s National Bureau of Statistics released fourth quarter GDP growth statistics for 2008 today, and it turns out that (according to their initial estimates) the Chinese economy expanded by 6.8 per cent in the last quarter of the year when compared with the same period in 2007. This was the weakest quarterly year on year growth rate in seven years. For the year as a whole, the economy grew 9 per cent, down from the revised 13 per cent growth rate in 2007.

Strikingly, Japanese exports to the US were down some 37% yoy, losing some 26pp since the 11% yoy contraction in July. But we cannot highlight strongly enough how truly mindboggling Japan’s collapse in exports to China are. Last July they were expanding at a 16% yoy pace. Now they are contracting at a 35% yoy rate! This is a phenomenon throughout the region. Hence despite the notoriously manipulated Chinese GDP data showing a shocking slowdown in GDP growth to 6.8% yoy, I would eat my hat if the Chinese economy was doing anything other than contracting right now. Albert Edwards Societe Generale

The steepness of this slowdown is likely to have a significant impact on much of the rest of Asia, which relies heavily on demand from China. Only this week a Singapore based economist friend of mine sent me this in an e-mail:

At S'pore's port container terminal (the busiest in the world), a third of the cranes are idle. There are some companies saying they have inventories stretching 6 months out. December's plunge in Asian exports was due to the shutdown of electronic companies during the Christmas period because of the pile up in inventories.

Basically there is still far to much we don't know about what is happening in China, like, for example, the seasonally adjusted quarter on quarter rate. Barclays Capital economist Peng Wensheng estimates that after taking into account seasonal adjustments, the Chinese economy barely grew at all in the fourth quarter compared with the third quarter. My feeling is that he is most probably right. Most of the consenus analysts are therefore very probably well behind the curve. Like Daiwa Institute of Research, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc. who while they all today reduced their estimates for China’s growth in 2009 remained at remarkably high levels. Daiwa cut to 6.3 percent from 7.5 percent; JPMorgan to 7.2 percent from 7.8 percent; and Citigroup to 7.6 percent from 8.2 percent. This seems to me to be the next best thing to living in "cloud cuckoo land".

Basically it seems to me that few people other than professional macro economists and bank analysts (and far from all of these if the truth be told) really realise what the implications of such a dramatic decline in year on year GDP actually means. If the quarter on quarter rate of expansion was very low indeed, possibly verging on the negative then - guessing a bit, you know what they call back of the envelope stuff - this means output must have been moving in the October-December period somewhere in an annualised 0 to 2% range. This means we may well see quarter on quarter negative growth in 2009 in China, and that the possibility of a technical recession of two consecutive quarters of negative growth must be over 50% at this point. It wasn't so long ago that the consensus was saying that annual GDP growth which was as high as 6% would be tantamount to a recession!

It is really very frustrating to find that with all the trillions of dollars at issue, and a whole army of China watchers, virtually no one seems to be trying to derive monthly and quarterly rates of movement from the official statistics.

The OECD do at least seem to be aware of this problem and they do have a lead indicator for China (which includes items like cargo handled at ports, Enterprise deposits, Chemical fertilizer production, Non ferrous metal production, a Monetary aggregate M2, and Imports from Asia. Below I have a chart which compares this indicator for both Spain and China. Since Spain, as we know, is having a very strong contraction at this moment in time, it gives some sort of reference point. What is so striking is that it appears China is now slowing much more rapidly than even Spain, and GDP may, looking at the steepness of the recent month on month drops,have even started contracting in November. This is obviously all shell shock stuff.



Societe Generale economist Albert Edwards is one of those who has been drawing our attention to the rapid decline in China's GDP (although I myself had a go here) and he uses one very interesting "proxy" (an indicator which can serve as a rough and ready substitute for something else, in this case movement in GDP) - electricity output. If you look at the 3 month year-on-year moving average for electricity output in China (see chart below) you will see it is already falling, which means that (in all probability) China's GDP is falling, which is just wow!

The history of using electrical output as a convenient proxy where we simply don't have very adequate data has a long and reputable history - going back to the pioneering work of US growth theorist Edward Dennison in the 1960s - but in case you feel that the correlation may not be a good one, here (see below) is a chart from Edwards which shows China GDP and electricity output compared. The fit is obviously not a perfect one, but that isn't the name of the game here, what should be evident is that a drop in electrical output as large as the one we are seeing in China at this point will be reflected in a very sharp reduction in GDP output.




Which takes me on to my next point, how reliable is Chinese data? Well, perhaps I am going to surprise some of you here, but I would day that for my purposes it doesn't really matter, since what I think we need to know is the rate of contraction (or expansion) in Chinese GDP, and not its absolute level. What matters to the rest of the world is not expecially how rich - or poor - China actually is (from a macro economic analysis point of view that is), but how rapidly it is expanding - or contracting - and what the rate of export and reserves growth is. The rest is interesting, but from a nuts and bolts point of view, it constitutes what Boris Vian used to call froth on the daydream. If the official data is rather inaccurate, then it is not unreasonable to assume that the inbuilt biases are the same from one time period to the next (the same point applies to the existence of the so called "informal economy"), and so my message here is - arrived at on the basis of looking at one economy after another in rapid succession - how much we can learn from how little, if only we know what we are looking for that is. This electrical output picture is also to some extent confirmed by China's manufacturing purchasing managers index, which has been contracting for some months now, and to an extent which begins to be compatible with GDP contraction, given the dependence of China on manufacturing activity.



Well China isn't quite in Great Depression mode yet, but manufacturing activity - which forms the core of the Chinese economy and accounts for 43% of all activity - is already very close to a technical recession, and phew, it wasn't very long ago that the Chinese economy was registering double digit growth. So the turn around is gigantic. The "close to technical recession in manufacturing industry" call comes from the people over at CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, who compile the China purchasing managers index, and they base their judgement on the fact that their Chinese manufacturing index has now been registering contraction for five consecutive months.

Export Slump

China is an export driven economy, and you can't simply switch from external to internal demand as a driver at the click of a finger (or mouse, if you make your financial transactions online). Another economist who mailed me this morning said this:

"I don't cover China so unfortunately, my views on that country are not very informed, but I do agree with your point about the China internal consumption argument. In my opinion, the belief that domestic consumption will take over from exports as a growth engine is nothing more than myth. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding the argument, but when factories and the export sector, in general, are bleeding jobs, it would be rather odd for internal consumption to take off at this point in time."

So what is happening to exports? Well, China’s exports fell the most in nearly a decade in December, with shipments down by 2.8 percent over December 2007. That compares with a 21.7 percent increase a year earlier. Over the whole of 2008 exports were up by 17.2 percent, a reduction on the 25.7 percent gain registered in 2007, and suggesting that the drop in the last two months of the year may have been very sharp indeed. Exports to the European Union, China’s biggest export market, fell 3.5 percent in December from a year earlier. Shipments to the U.S. dropped 4.1 percent. Imports dropped even more sharply - by 21.3 percent, meaning the trade surplus failed to fall, and at $39 billion it remained the second-biggest on record.

And China's declining imports are also being felt elsewhere, since in Japan's December trade report (which was out this morning, and was a complete horror story) we find that exports to China were down 35.5 percent year on year.

So to some up, while it may well be true that China is not (yet) entering the Second Great Depression, I am arguing that China is really going to be one of the worst case scenarios in the current global recession, and that consensus thinking still has a very very long way to go in catching up with events in the China case.

The Second Great Depression Wends Its Way Forward in December

And lands in China.



Well China isn't quite in Great Depression mode yet, but manufacturing activity - which forms the core of the Chinese economy and accounts for 43% of all activity - is already very close to a technical recession, and phew, it wasn't very long ago that the Chinese economy was registering double digit growth. So the turn around is gigantic. The "close to technical recession in manufacturing industry" call comes from the people over at CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, who compile the China purchasing managers index, and they base their judgement on the fact that their Chinese manufacturing index has now been registering contraction for five consecutive months.

Now for those of you who are new to the world of Purchasing Manager's Indexes (PMIs), welcome. Basically these indexes are very useful, since they give you a "just in time" point of reference to tell you what is actually happening. These are composite indexes - measuring things like current output, new orders (both domestic and export), employment and input prices. They are not perfect, but they are reasonably accurate - the fit which you can get between composite PMIs (manufacturing and services combined) and GDP is often attractively good - and in a country like China where the main data we get is year-on-year (which in a critical moment of rapid change like this one is virtually useless) it is very hard to see what is happening. The Shanghai-based Industrial Bank estimate, for example, that GDP growth in China will be 5.6% in Q4 2008. But what does that data point - if accurate - tell us? That the economy is slowing fast, well we already knew that. But just how fast? Well GDP was 9% in Q3 - down from 10.1% in Q2. So the deceleration is very rapid, but did the Chinese economy actually manage to contract in Q4? I doubt it, but it may do in Q1 2009, although the only way we would really know would be if the National Statistics Office published quarter-on-quarter seasonally adjusted numbers, which as far as I can see they don't. Indeed only a small group of highly developed economies actually take the trouble to do this, and you don't even find all EU member countries doing it yet, although Eurostat (thank god for Eurostat) do require such data from members (but those of you who ever get round to checking will see there are still blanks for some countries in the Eurostat quarterly releases).

Hence you can see why, in the case of somewhere like China, the PMIs are very, very useful, for those of us who would like to try and follow what is happening as it actually happens.

As for the PMI itself, China’s composite manufacturing index contracted for the fifth consecutive month in December as recessions in the U.S., Europe and Japan bit deep into demand for exports - indeed China's exports fell year on year for the first time in seven years in November. The CLSA China Purchasing Managers’ Index registered a seasonally adjusted 41.2, compared with a record low of 40.9 in November. On such indexes any reading below 50 reflects a contraction.

Despite the apparent small improvement in December the current output index actually fell sharply, and was down to a record low of 38.6 from 39.2 in November, so production was falling, and the index was basically nudged up slightly by other factors, such as the measure of new orders which rebounded to 37 from 36.1, driven by a rise in export orders to 33.6 from a horrific 28.2 in November. However, according to the report, Chinese manufacturers reduced the size of their workforces at a series record in December, and the employment index has now contracted for five consecutive months, to hit 45.2 in December.


So where exactly are we? Well we aren't (quite) in the Second Great Depression yet, but the situation is deteriorating, and rapidly. Manufacturing output is now contracting at quite a sharp pace, while it was rising in the first half of the year at something like a 15% year on year rate. In a useful summary of the Chinese situation back in November, Nouriel Roubini defined a hard landing in China - which he felt was coming - as follows:

There is thus now a growing risk of a hard landing in China. Let us be clear what we mean by hard landing. In a country with the potential growth of China, a hard landing would occur if the growth rate of the economy were to slow down to 5-6% as China needs a growth rate of 9-10% to absorb about 24 million folks joining the labor force every year; it needs a growth rate of 9-10% to move every year about 12-14 million poor rural farmers to the modern industrial/manufacturing urban sector.

This is more or less the consensus view of what we used to think a hard landing would mean in China, but I think the latest data already take us beyond that. I think there is now a real risk of a technical recession in the more or less classic sense of two consecutive quarters of negative growth (let's say that the risk is 50-50 at this point), and of serious economic and financial dislocation following in the train of this (btw, just how quickly can you burn your way through $1.7 trillion in reserves, it will be an interesting experiment I think).

Brad Setser (further down the same link) has long been more cautious on China, being sceptical about the impact of a dramatic slowdown in exports (and even more importantly in export oriented investment) on an export driven economy, but those of us who have been closely watching other export dependent economies like Germany and Japan over the last decade and a half were surely not quite so sceptical. However even Brad himself is clear that the possibility of an export downturn feeding its way back into the domestic economy - via some sort of negative feedback process - is real enough:

But the real key to forecasting China’s future growth consequently is determining whether domestic consumption and above all investment will continue to grow strongly in the absence of strong export demand. Remember, over the past few years both domestic investment and exports increased rapidly. If they fall together as well, Chinese growth will slow quite significantly. And unfortunately the latest indicators seem to suggest that they are correlated; consequently domestic demand may fall along with exports.

The $1.7 trillion question is, then, just why China is so export dependent? Doubtless there are many factors at work, but one of these is, I am almost sure, China's very special demographics (30 years of one child per familiy policy), and the special problems that these present in the context of building a sustainable national pensions system at the same time as the population pyramid inverts. Obviously the absence of a credible pension system has to be one of the factors influencing the strong desire to save which we are seeing in China. Economics Nobel Franco Modigliani also thought this, and specifically addressed the Chinese saving puzzle in his last published paper:

China's per capita income ranks below 100th in the world. Its saving rate, however, has been one of the highest worldwide in recent decades. In this paper, we attempt to explain the seeming paradox within the framework of the Life-Cycle Hypothesis developed by Franco Modigliani. The key LCH variables are income and population growth. Our results based on data we put together from official sources show that income growth has been the dominant factor behind the dramatic increase in China's saving rate, as predicted by the LCH. Demographic structure and inflation also had significant impact on the fluctuations of the saving rate.
The Chinese Saving Puzzle and the Life-Cycle Hypothesis - Franco Modigliani and Shi Larry Cao

By Way Of Brief Conclusion

Well basically, the conclusion here is that there is no conclusion, at this point at least. But I would draw attention to two potential points of interest for all you "economy watchers".

Firstly, a couple of months back my fellow blogger Doug Muir drew our attention to a very interesting point being made by US economic historian Scott Reynolds Nelson:

As a historian who works on the 19th century, I have been reading my newspaper with a considerable sense of dread. While many commentators on the recent mortgage and banking crisis have drawn parallels to the Great Depression of 1929, that comparison is not particularly apt. Two years ago, I began research on the Panic of 1873, an event of some interest to my colleagues in American business and labor history but probably unknown to everyone else. But as I turn the crank on the microfilm reader, I have been hearing weird echoes of recent events.

At the time of reading this I thought to myself hmmmm! This isn't that simple, but he is on to something. Basically I think no two (or does that make it now three) Great Depressions are ever really exactly alike. I certainly think the resemblence between what is going on now and what happened between 1929 and 1933 is more than passing (especially for the sequencing, of which more in another post), but evidently there are elements of the 1873 one too, and Scott Reynolds puts his finger on some of them, especially in the context of surplus to requirement investment and large capacity overhangs. So my best guess is that what we have is a hybrid, and that what is now happening in China is the best example of the underlying dynamics behind that other great depression that hit our grand- (or great grand) parents and that may well be now about to come back to hit us, boomerang style.

Which brings me to my second point, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which, as wikipedia explain, was signed into law on June 17, 1930, and raised U.S. tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods to record levels. After the act was passed, many other countries retaliated with their own increased tariffs on U.S. goods, and American exports and imports plunged by more than half. Many economists now regard the Smoot-Hawley Act as having been the principal feedback catalyst for the severe reduction in U.S.-European trade, and which took it from the 1929 high down to the depressed levels of 1932 and which thus accompanied the start of the Great Depression. And here, in the spectre of a repeat performance comes just the danger we face in the wake of the dramatic contraction which is now underway in China.

It is my personal guess that the first major issue to face Barack Obama as President of the United States may well be what to do about China, and especially what to do about a China which lets - as I now suspect they may well do - the yuan float, in order to see it float DOWN as the economy unwinds. If this does indeed happen then Obama will really have to struggle to hold back the protectionist pressure I think.

China's Manufacturing Contracts Sharply In November

China’s manufacturing shrank by the most on record and export orders plunged, providing more evidence that recessions in the U.S., Europe and Japan are sharply slowing what was previously the world’s fastest-growing major economy. The Purchasing Managers’ Index fell to a seasonally adjusted 38.8 in November from 44.6 in October, according to the China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing. The output index fell to 35.5 from 44.3, while the index of new orders dropped to 32.3 from 41.7. On these indexes any reading below 50 means contraction, and as can be seen in the chart below, China's manufacturing industry has now been contracting (month on month) in four of the last five months. The November reading stands out though, since the magnitude of the contraction has accelerated sharply.






A separate index - the CLSA China Purchasing Managers’ Index - reveals a similar picture, and fell to a seasonally adjusted 40.9 in November from 45.2 in October. The CLSA index, which was started in April 2004, is based on a survey of more than 400 manufacturing companies.

Output, new orders and export orders had record contractions. The output index fell to 39.2 in November from 43.4 in October, while the index of new orders declined to 36.1 from 43.8. The index of export orders dropped to 28.2 from 44.3, CLSA said.

A slump in property sales and building work is also undermining growth. Construction of homes, offices and factories contracted at least 16.6 percent in October after a 32.5 percent expansion a year earlier, according to a report from Macquarie Securities.